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thereafter make them inferior. They ought not to do so. Such talk is the talk of a man of war and not of a man of peace. It is the *status quo* which is crushing and ruining the nations. The purpose of the Czar can never be reached if the *status quo* is long to be maintained. The *status quo* must be gotten rid of. That is what the Czar wants, and it is what all humane people want—the beginning, be it never so small, of disarmament.

The Treaty and the Philippines.

The treaty of peace with Spain has arrived at Washington and will be sent to the Senate immediately after the holiday recess. According to the text of it which has been published, Spain by the treaty *cedes* to the United States the Philippines, as well as Porto Rico and the other Spanish West Indies except Cuba, the sovereignty of which she *renounces*.

The prospect is that the treaty will be taken up immediately and pushed to a vote, with every probability at the present time that it will be ratified. A few Senators are strongly opposed to ratification and will hold out to the last, but the Senate as a whole seems inclined to ratify it with little delay.

The Administration, judging from all indications, is determined that ratification shall mean annexation. The treaty is drawn that way. Everybody, of course, wants peace with Spain ratified, and every Senator would like to vote that way, but the treaty is so drawn that no one can vote for the ratification of the peace without at the same time voting for annexation. Much is said about ratifying first and then determining what disposition shall be made of the Philippines. But that is a mere ruse. When the treaty is ratified, if that little word *cedes* remains in it, the Philippines will be from that instant as much an integral part of the United States territory as Alaska or California or Massachusetts. It is a very clever stroke of the annexationists to want to get the thing ratified first, for the sake of the peace, and the question of disposition considered afterwards. What will there be to consider afterwards, except the manner of government? If the Administration had honestly meant that the question of disposition should remain an open one after ratification, it could very easily have had the word "renounce" used instead of "cede." It is this consideration which will justify all those Senators who are opposed to the extension of United States sovereignty over the Philippines in voting against the treaty in its present form, even though formal peace with Spain may have to wait a little. We wish that at least a third of them might have the clearness of vision and the courage to do so. There is no more danger of war now with Spain; the danger of

war and of one knows not how many other evils lies in the other direction.

However, even though the ratification of the treaty will annex the Philippines and make it much harder afterwards to undo what ought not to have been done, we do not yet despair that final and permanent sovereignty over them by this country will be ultimately refused.

Many Senators who will vote for ratification are opposed absolutely to such sovereignty. The subject will be taken up and discussed with great thoroughness when the question of permanent government of the far away islands comes up. Meanwhile, throughout the country, discussion of the subject goes on with increasing earnestness. It is the one engrossing topic of thought and of speech. The anti-imperialist agitation is gaining strength every day. The labor organizations are declaring against the military burdens and tyrannies which imperialist control of 8,000,000 of vassals on the other side of the globe will impose. The nation is being "shaken" and tested as never before in its history, and we cannot yet believe that when it has time to think it will deny itself and turn deliberately away from its political history and principles to a form of semi-tyrannical political control of vassal peoples which belongs to the past and not to the future.

It is not true, as is clamored by the expansionists in a last effort to beat down their opponents, that the anti-annexationists have nothing constructive to offer. If they offered nothing constructive, they would still be less blameworthy than those who offer that which is chiefly destructive. But what is it they propose? That the Philippines, who clearly wish to be free, should be helped to be free. That the United States, alone or with the coöperation of other civilized countries, should aid them in setting up and maintaining a government for themselves, through a period of twenty-five or fifty years, if need be. The anti-annexationists declare that if we can annex the islands and control them in the face of the rest of world, we can with just as much ease, with vastly less expense, with no denial of our political principles, with infinitely greater advantage to civilization and without plunging into a bottomless abyss of devouring militarism, help them to train themselves to self-government. It is the purest begging of the question to say that the Philipinos are incapable of self-government in some form. They have never had the opportunity to try it. If it is our duty to give them a stable government, it is our duty to make that government such as shall secure their freedom moral and political. The United States has no mission to go about the world establishing over unwilling peoples government whose stability is founded on the sword and on political inequality. Tyranny, under no matter what profession, is tyranny still. To attempt to solve the problem now pre-

sented in the Philippines in the way in which the fervid expansionists propose to solve it is to attempt nothing that deserves the name of construction. It is destruction in every aspect of it,—to the character and strength of our own country, to the struggling sense of freedom in the Philipinos themselves and to the higher Christian civilization whose foremost champion we have been through a century of growing light and hope.

Editorial Notes.

The President on
the Czar's Proposal.

The following passage is President McKinley's comment in his message on the Czar's manifesto :

"The proposal of the Czar for a general reduction of the vast military establishments that weigh so heavily upon many people in time of peace was communicated to this government with an earnest invitation to be represented in the conference which it is contemplated to assemble with a view to discussing the means of accomplishing so desirable a result. His majesty was at once informed of the cordial sympathy of this government with the principle involved in his exalted proposals and of the readiness of the United States to take part in the conference.

The active military force of the United States, as measured by our population, territorial area and taxable wealth, is, and under any conceivable prospective conditions must continue to be, in time of peace so conspicuously less than that of the armed powers to whom the Czar's appeal is especially addressed that the question can have for us no practical importance, save as marking an auspicious step toward the betterment and goodwill among them; but in this view it behooves us as a nation to lend countenance and aid to the beneficent proposal."

The latter part of this statement would seem patronizing if it were not so evidently sincere. How Mr. McKinley makes out that the question has no practical importance for us "under any conceivable prospective conditions," we cannot comprehend. He evidently did not grasp the full import of what he was writing, or if he did, he purposely meant to blind the country. England is spending this year on her army, in round numbers, \$100,000,000, France \$130,000,000, Germany \$120,000,000, Russia \$190,000,000. The regular army of 100,000 which is now asked for by the President and Secretary Alger is to cost, by estimation, \$167,000,000 the coming year, or about four times as much per soldier as the armies of Europe. Add to this \$50,000,000 for the navy and \$150,000,000 which we are paying for war pensions, and we shall have the colossal sum of \$367,000,000 to be paid in a single year for war purposes. The President must know that if our standing army begins to grow, excuses will be found for its further increase. It is not visionary, therefore, to say that, if the present tenden-

cies, operating in the nation, are allowed to act, the time is not far away when, in spite of our population and our taxable wealth, the question raised by the Czar will have for us an importance altogether different from that of mere goodwill to the rest of humanity. We shall soon need some goodwill shown to us.

North and
South.

The President "has waded right into the hearts of the Southern people," it is said. He has led them in singing "America." He has exalted to the skies their "patriotism" and their "courage" in the recent war. He has told them that the time has come when the nation should help them in the care of the Confederate graves. He has even gone so far as to put on and wear a Confederate badge and march with old Confederate troops. The nation has been quick to respond to the sensible part of what the President has said and done in the South, but there has been a large feeling that he has been entirely too dramatic for a President and that in some of his sayings and doings he has gone much beyond the bounds of good sense, to say the least. We have the deepest sympathy with all proper and right efforts to wipe out the old animosities between the North and the South and to bring the two sections of the country into an abiding friendship. The animosity has been disappearing and the friendship growing for many years. The recent war has had very little to do with it, except to give it opportunity to manifest itself in certain directions by a portion of the South. But the roots of the reconciliation and re-union are not war-roots at all. They are the permanent, peaceful interests of the country, and both North and South have for many years been wise enough to allow themselves to be led by these interests to abandon their grudges and prejudices. What has pained us about the President's extravagances in the South is that there has been in them so much glorification of war, as if the recent war had been the chief glory of the century as well as the chief agency in cementing North and South. Some of the President's utterances and doings seem to reveal the real motive which was actuating him to say and do these strange things. He evidently meant to win his auditors to his expansionist policy. He knew that the South as a whole, as shown in a recent canvass of the leading newspapers, was opposed to imperialism. He has himself drifted so far out on the wild, fascinating sea of imperialism, that he seems determined by every hook and crook to carry all sections of the country with him. But for the necessities of his imperialist policy, William McKinley would never have worn a Confederate badge, or offered to turn the Confederate graves into national graves. We doubt if sober-minded men in the South itself will have as high a regard for the President as they would have had if he had acted